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How U.S. Family Law Might Deal with
Spousal Relationships of Three (or More)
People
Edward Stein*
ABSTRACT
For much of this nation’s history, the vast majority of people have believed
that being married to more than one person at the same time is deeply
problematic. Further, polygamous marriage has never been legal in the
United States. Despite this, some people have been in plural or group
relationships and some of these people have wished to gain legal recognition
for these relationships. The arguments for recognizing such relationships are
persuasive, but the prospects for legalization of polygamous marriage seem
slim in the near future. This Article offers a suggestion of how the law of
domestic relations might deal with such relationships, focusing on same-sex
“triads.” The proposal is that domestic partnership or civil union laws,
which remain on the books in some jurisdictions, but are now rarely used,
could be repurposed and adapted to recognize and protect triads and perhaps
other group and plural relationships.
I.
In 2000, Allen and Brian began dating.1 Within a year, they moved in
together. About a year after they began cohabitating, they met Charles
through mutual friends and the three of them became romantically and
* Professor of Law and Director of Gertrud Mainzer Program in Family Law, Policy, and
Bioethics, Cardozo School of Law. For helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article,
thanks to Sally Goldfarb, Suzanne Kim, Solangel Maldonado, Kaiponanea Matsumura, and Emily
Stolzenberg as well as several of my colleagues at Cardozo School of Law and participants of the
Non-Marriage Roundtable on March 1, 2019 held at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University for their comments. Thanks also to Jaynah Ross-Mendoza for providing
research assistance. This project was supported by the Gertrude Mainzer Program in Family Law,
Policy, and Bioethics.
Portions of this Article are adapted from Edward Stein, Plural Marriage, Group Marriage
and Immutability in Obergefell v. Hodges and Beyond, 84 UMKC L. REV. 871 (2016).
1.
The names of the parties and some details of their relationship have been changed to
protect their privacy. The information about their relationship was gleaned from separate inperson and telephone interviews with the three individuals.
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sexually involved. At that time, they now say, Allen and Brian were happy
as a new couple and neither of them nor Charles was particularly interested
in a romantic or sexual relationship with two people at the same time. “It just
happened,” one of them reported. Over the next several months, Charles
began spending a great deal of time with Allen and Brian; within the year,
the three of them moved to a larger home that they purchased together. “Our
relationship with [Charles] developed organically over the course of the first
year we knew him,” Allen explained. The three-person “marriage-like”
relationship has continued through the present, for approximately twenty
years (and counting). This Article offers a suggestion of how the law of
domestic relations might deal with “triads” like Allen, Brian and Charles and
other relationships like theirs.2 My proposal is that domestic partnership or
civil union laws, which remain on the books in some jurisdictions but that
are, for the most part, rarely used anymore, could be repurposed and adapted
to recognize and protect triads and other group and plural relationships.
Since its inception, marriage law in the United States has been
characterized by a “one-at-a-time” rule: while a person can have multiple
spouses over the course of a lifetime, a person cannot have more than one
spouse at a time. In some eras in some communities in the United States, a
non-trivial number of people have been in marriage-like relationships with
more than one person at a time. From 1843 to 1890, the Mormon Church
advocated plural or celestial marriages in which one husband had multiple
wives.3 Also, there was a period of time from when slavery was legal in the
southern part of the United States until shortly after the Civil War that some
African-Americans were involved in multiple marriage-like relationships at
the same time.4 And recently, there has been an increased openness about
plural marriage,5 spurred in part by television shows (both fictional and
“reality” TV) about such relationships.6 Still, there is no jurisdiction in the
United States where a person who is presently married to another person may

2.
A triad (also sometime called a “throuple”) is a marriage-like relationship among three
people in which all three are romantically involved with each other. A marriage-like relationship
among four people is called a “quad” and one involving more than four people is called a
“moresome.” See, e.g., RONALD C. DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE 9 (2015).
3.
See, e.g., JESSIE L. EMBRY, MORMON POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES: LIFE IN THE PRINCIPLE
41–52 (1987); RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY 1–16 (2d ed. 1989).
4.
KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY (2015).
5.
See, e.g., JANET BENNION, POLYGAMY IN PRIMETIME: MEDIA, GENDER, AND POLITICS IN
MORMON FUNDAMENTALISM 283 (2011).
6.
See, e.g., Big Love (HBO) (scripted TV show that ran for five seasons); Sister Wives
(TLC) (reality TV show that ran for twelve seasons).
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legally marry a third person.7 (Further, all jurisdictions in the U.S. still have
the crime of bigamy on the books,8 five states specifically outlaw bigamy
and/or polygamy in their state constitutions,9 and two states make it a crime
to teach that polygamy is a good thing.10) So marriage is not, in its current
form in the United States, of use to Allen, Brian and Charles and triads like
them. If it weren’t for Charles and their relationship with him, Allen and
Brian acknowledge that they probably would have married by now. One of
them said, “We would like legal recognition for our relationship, but it
wouldn’t be fair to [Charles] if we got married.” Marriage is similarly
unhelpful to triads like Brynn, Kitten, and Doll Young, two of whom were
already married before they met the third.11 Brynn and Kitten were married
in Massachusetts in 2011 (same-sex marriage having been legal there since
2004).12 They later met and fell in love with Doll.13 While the three of them
had a commitment ceremony in 2014, this commitment ceremony had no
legal effect because the prior marriage of Brynn and Kitten was an
impediment to recognizing a marriage or marriage-like relationship with
Doll.14
Of course, much has changed regarding relationship recognition in the
United States since the time Allen and Brian met. When they met in 2000,
two people of the same sex could not marry in any jurisdiction in the United
7.
Recently, in Colombia, two surviving partners were granted pension benefits after the
death of their partner in a group, marriage-like relationship. See Adam Veitch, Medellin Judge
Grants Pension to Polyamorous Husbands, COLOMBIA REPORTS (June 4, 2019),
https://colombiareports.com/medellin-judge-grants-pension-rights-to-polyamorous-husbands/
[https://perma.cc/6CJM-PRRJ].
8.
The distinction between bigamy and polygamy is often not kept clear. As I use it,
polygamy is a type of relationship structure in which at least one party in it has more than one
spouse at the same time. When I say that no state allows for polygamy, I am saying something
about the domestic relations law of the several states—that is, it is not legally permissible for a
person to be married to more than one person at a time. Bigamy is a crime (specifically, a felony)
consisting of having, or attempting to have, two spouses at the same time. See Diane J. Klein,
Plural Marriage and Community Property Law, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 33, 81–89
(collecting bigamy laws in the U.S.).
9.
Arizona (ARIZ. CONST. art. XX, § 2); Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4); New Mexico
(N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 1); Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2); Utah (UTAH CONST. art. III).
10. Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.441); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 9729-43).
11. David K. Li, Married Lesbian ‘Throuple’ Expecting First Child, N.Y. POST (Apr. 23,
2014),
http://nypost.com/2014/04/23/married-lesbian-threesome-expecting-first-child/
[https://perma.cc/6DBQ-UB88]. Chief Justice Roberts mentioned this article in his dissent in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2622 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
12. Id.; see Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969–70 (Mass. 2003)
(allowing same-sex couples to marry for the first time in the United States).
13. Li, supra note 11.
14. Id.
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States. Relatively soon after, however, relationship recognition for same-sex
couples swept the country. By 2012, there was a complicated patchwork of
recognition and nonrecognition for same sex-couples.15 In 2015, after the
Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Obergefell v. Hodges,16
same-sex couples such as Allen and Brian could marry throughout the United
States. But Obergefell did not change the landscape for the legal recognition
of triads like Allen, Brian, and Charles. Or did it?
Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent in Obergefell, said that “much of the
majority’s reasoning would apply with equal force to the claim of a
fundamental right to plural marriage.”17 Of course, Roberts did not intend this
as an argument that states should be required to solemnize the second (or
third) marriage of a person who is already married (and not divorced and
whose first spouse is alive). Rather, he meant it as a “slippery slope”
argument against the majority’s conclusion that the U.S. Constitution
requires all states to solemnize marriages between same-sex couples.18
Even so, in 2015, shortly after Obergefell was decided, Nathan Collier,
who had married Victoria Collier in 2000 (the same year that Allen and Brian
met) sought, with Victoria’s knowledge and consent, a marriage license in
Montana to solemnize his relationship with Christine, another woman with
whom he was sexually and romantically involved and with whom he had a
religious wedding ceremony in 2007.19 In federal district court, Nathan and
Christine argued that they had a right to marry—even though Nathan was
already married to Victoria—citing Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent.20 A
Magistrate Judge rejected the Colliers’ challenge to Montana’s marriage and
bigamy laws on various grounds.21 The Judge noted that Roberts’ dissent
explicitly did not “‘equate marriage between same-sex couples with plural
marriage in all respects,’”22 that he acknowledged that “‘[t]here may well be
relevant differences [between same-sex marriages and plural marriages] that

15. Edward Stein, The Topography of Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships, 50
FAM. CT. REV. 181, 181–82 (2012).
16. 135 S. Ct. 2584.
17. Id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 2621–22. For discussion of slippery slope arguments against same-sex marriage
based on polygamy, see, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155, 1170 n.45 (2005).
19. Collier v. Fox, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39261, *2–4 (D. Mont. Feb. 22, 2018); Montana
Officials Deny Wedding License for Polygamous Trio, DESERT NEWS (July 16, 2015, 3:19 PM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/765677586/Montana-officials-deny-wedding-license-forpolygamous-trio.html [https://perma.cc/5MDK-YH7L].
20. Collier, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39261, at *21.
21. Id. at *22–24.
22. Id. at *21 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
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compel different legal analysis,’”23 and further, that Roberts’ dissent was not
binding precedent.24 After the district court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s
findings in full, the Colliers decided not to appeal.25 A higher-profile
challenge to a state’s polygamy laws did receive a more favorable
(pre-Obergefell) ruling in federal district court,26 but—despite Chief Justice
Roberts’ expression of concern about the fate of this decision on appeal27—
the Tenth Circuit found this challenge to be moot and vacated the lower
court’s decision.28
Despite increasingly powerful scholarly arguments in favor of legal
recognition of plural and group marriage,29 I do not expect that, in the near
future, marriage law in the United States is going to be changed to
accommodate such relationships either through legislative action or through
a judicial decision finding that the “one at a time” rule that characterizes
marriage law violates the U.S. Constitution or a state constitution.30 Drawing
on the idea that family law should be responsive to how people in fact
structure and live their lives, in this Article, I suggest a more viable—given
the political realities of the United States—form for legal recognition for
plural and group relationships that is short of legalizing such marriages.31
Setting aside children in the context of these types of relationships,32 people
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at *21–23; see also Phoebe Tollefson, U.S. Rules Against Montana Polygamist Trio
Who Sued over Marriage License Denial, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://billingsgazette.com/news/local/u-s-rules-against-montana-polygamist-trio-who-suedover/article_01d1a02e-0b62-5fc6-9187-687de42c90fa.html [https://perma.cc/LNG6-V34F].
26. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1234 (D. Utah 2013), vacated by 822 F.3d
1151 (10th Cir. 2016).
27. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2621 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
28. Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1511, 1179, (10th Cir. 2016), rehearing en banc denied,
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23522 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 794 (U.S. 2017).
29. See, e.g., DEN OTTER, supra note 2. But see JOHN WITTE, JR., THE WESTERN CASE FOR
MONOGAMY OVER POLYGAMY (2015).
30. I admit that my published predictions about the expected evolution of marriage law in
the United States have proven mistaken in recent years. See, e.g., Edward Stein, Looking Beyond
Full Relationship Recognition for Couples Regardless of Sex: Abolition, Alternatives, and/or
Functionalism, 28 L. & INEQ.: J. THEORY & PRAC. 345, 348 (2010) (expressing my doubts that
same-sex couples will have full marriage equality across the entire United States in my lifetime);
Obergefell proved me wrong within five years.
31. Sally Goldfarb made quite similar proposals at the same roundtable where I first
presented this project. See Sally F. Goldfarb, To Recognize or Not To Recognize Plural Unions:
Is a Non-Marital Relationship Status the Solution to the Dilemma?, FAM. CT. REV. (forthcoming).
Despite the similarities of our proposals, some—but not all—of the motivations for our respective
proposals are different.
32. There are five U.S. jurisdictions with statutes that explicitly recognize three or more
parents: California (CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2017)), Louisiana (LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
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in plural and group relationships need to deal with joint finances, ownership
of property, estate planning, relationship dissolution, and financial security.
They can do so through wills, living wills, cohabitation agreements, health
care proxies, joint ownership of property, and other legal agreements (such
as partnerships, limited liability partnerships, or limited liability companies),
but most of these legal instruments take time and money to negotiate and
draft and even the most elaborate and sophisticated versions of such
documents cannot come close to replicating the benefits and protections
associated with marriage. And children cannot always be set aside because
some people in group and plural relationships do have children, children
whose relationships with the adults in their lives warrant respect and legal
protection.33
As an alternative, my suggestion, based on the recent history of the
development of legal recognition for same-sex couples, is to look to
marriage-like relationships such as civil unions and domestic partnerships as
arts. 197 & 198 (2017)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 1853(2) (2017)), Vermont (VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 206 (West 2017)), and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.100
(West 2017)). Louisiana’s is the most restrictive of these statutory regimes, insofar as it only
allows for dual paternity in cases where the child’s mother is married to someone other than the
biological father of the child; if the biological father claims paternity promptly, Louisiana law
allows for the child to have three parents. For more detailed discussion of Louisiana law on this
point, see Colleen M. Quinn, Mom, Mommy & Daddy and Daddy, Dad & Mommy: Assisted
Reproductive Technologies & the Evolving Legal Recognition of Tri-Parenting, 31 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. L. 175, 183–85 (2018); and June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Parents, Babies, and More
Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 9, 20–23 (2017). At least two other U.S. jurisdictions have statutes
that allow for the possibility of a child having more than two parents when a child’s parent(s)
gives permission to another adult to become a de facto parent of their child, namely Delaware
(DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 8-201(c)(1) (West 2017)) and Washington, D.C. (D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-831.01(1)(A)(iii) (West 2017)). Courts in at least five more states have, in published
opinions, held that children can have more than two legal parents: Minnesota (LaChapelle v.
Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)), New Jersey (D.G. v. K.S., 133 A.3d 703,
710 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2015)), New York (Dawn M. v. Michael M., 55 Misc. 3d 865, 871
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017)), North Dakota (McAllister v. McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652, 65859 (N.D.
2010)), and Pennsylvania (Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)). Other
states may allow three parents to be listed on a child’s birth certificate, see Quinn, supra note 32,
at 198 (mentioning Florida and Nevada), and there are unreported decisions in various U.S.
jurisdictions that seem to have held that a child can have more than two parents, id. at 199–200
(mentioning Alaska, New Jersey, Oregon, Virginia & Washington, D.C.). For further discussion
of the possibility of a child having more than two parents, see Susan F. Appleton, Parents by the
Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (2008); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Custody and Visitation
in Families with Three (or More) Parents, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 399 (2018); Carbone & Cahn,
Parents, Babies, and More Parents, supra note 32; Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two?
Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents,
9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309 (2007).
33. For a pathbreaking study of children of plural and group marriages, see ELISABETH
SHEFF, THE POLYAMORISTS NEXT DOOR: INSIDE MULTIPLE-PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS AND
FAMILIES 135–65 (2014).
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a way of providing additional legal protections for triads (and other group
and plural relationships). I emphasize same-sex triads like Allen, Brian and
Charles or Brynn, Kitten, and Doll because one of the primary objections to
polygamy in the United States has focused on the disadvantaged role of
women in such relationships.34 Because Allen, Brian, and Charles are
cis-gender men—and, similarly, because Brynn, Kitten, and Doll are
cis-gender women—asymmetrical power associated with gender differences
is not an issue in their relationships (or, at least, it is not as prominent as in
multi-sex triads, that is, triads that have one partner who is of a different sex
from the other two partners). That said, my argument for legal recognition of
triads through existing domestic partnership and civil union laws also applies
to multi-sex triads. I focus on triads more than quads or moresomes for
simplicity’s sake. I suspect that almost everything I say about the legal
recognition of triads also applies to quads but less so for moresomes.35
Because this is a short article and because my goal here is start a conversation
rather than, for example, provide a fully developed statutory proposal and a
detailed argument for it, I focus on triads. Whether (and how) a fully
developed statutory proposal would accommodate quads and other types of
relationship forms consisting of more than two people besides triads would
depends on details beyond the scope of this article.

34. See Nicholas Bala et al., An International Review of Polygamy: Legal and Policy
Implications for Canada, in POLYGAMY IN CANADA: LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR
WOMEN AND CHILDREN: A COLLECTION OF POLICY RESEARCH REPORTS 1, 36 (2005),
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/SW21-132-2005E.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ9H6HY5] (concluding “polygamy is associated with significant negative outcomes for women” and
that “[t]he problems with polygamy are profound and inherent in the relationship, and are often
caused by the polygamous relationship, not merely associated with it.”); Susan Moller Okin, Is
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7, 9–10 (Joshua
Cohen et al. eds., 1999); Hema Chatlani, In Defense of Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will
Not Lead Us Down a Slippery Slope Toward the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L.
101, 129–33 (2006); Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] BCSC
1588, ¶ 8 (Can.), available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/11/15/2011BCSC1588.htm
[https://perma.cc/FPZ7-QCAQ] (finding “[w]omen in polygamous relationships are at an
elevated risk of physical and psychological harm [and] face higher rates of domestic violence and
abuse, including sexual abuse”). See generally JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN:
A STORY OF VIOLENT FAITH (2003).
35. Consider, for example, California’s recently passed law that allows for a child to have
more than two legal parents. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (2017). This law and others like it do not
limit a child to three or four legal parents. Concerns have been raised that a line needs to be drawn
somewhere as to how many parents a child can have, and that, if the line is not drawn at two, then
it should be drawn at three or four. See., e.g., Quinn, supra note 32, at 205–6. Given the limited
scope of this article, I similarly do not try to justify my focus on triads and quads, rather than
larger marriage-like groups—and my hunch that triads and quads can be distinguished from
moresomes in a principled way—leaving that discussion for another occasion.
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Before Obergefell held that U.S. constitutional law requires that samesex couples have the right to marry across the United States,36 advocates of
marriage equality had successfully obtained, through litigation and
legislation, various modes of relationships recognition for same-sex couples,
including—starting in Massachusetts37—marriage, but also including civil
unions, domestic partnerships, and reciprocal beneficiaries. When Allen and
Brian moved in together, they were living in California. At the time,
California had a domestic partnership law which had been passed in 1999.38
Being a registered domestic partner in California at that time had very few
privileges associated with it including the right to visit one’s domestic partner
in the hospital and to be treated as one’s domestic partner’s next of kin when
he or she died.39 In addition, a few California employers, including several
municipalities, recognized registered domestic partners for purposes of health
insurance and other employee benefits.40 Allen and Brian were both in their
thirties at the time and were both employed, so they did not register as
domestic partners. Had they been registered as domestic partners, their legal
relationship with each other would have necessary excluded both from
entering a domestic partnership with Charles. This is because California
domestic partnership law at the time,41 like marriage and other relationship
recognition laws in the United States now and then, followed the one-at-atime rule.
Domestic partnerships and civil unions, while still on the books in thirteen
jurisdictions in United States,42 have, even in those jurisdictions, become
36. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588 (2015).
37. Goodridge v. Dep’t Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
38. Assemb. B. 26, 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999). For discussion, see Douglas
NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its
Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87, 152 (2014).
39. Assemb. B. 26, 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999).
40. See NeJaime, supra note 38.
41. Assemb. B. 26, 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999).
42. The following states that at one time had civil unions as a form of relationship
recognition for same-sex couples still have civil unions and still allow same-sex couples to obtain
civil unions: Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-15-101 (West 2017)) (civil unions available
to same-sex and different-sex couples), Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572B (West 2017))
(civil unions available to same-sex and different-sex couples), Illinois (750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 75/1 (West 2017)) (same) and New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-29 (West 2017)) (civil
unions only available to same-sex couples).
The following states that at one time had civil unions as a form of relationship recognition for
same-sex couples, in contrast, no longer allow couples to obtain civil unions but still have the
status of civil union under state law, as couples who had obtained civil unions were allowed to
retain that status: Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (West 2017)) and Rhode Island (15
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-3.1-12 (West 2017)). Couples who entered into civil unions before
Rhode Island permitted same-sex couples to marry were given three options: (1) maintaining civil
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mostly moribund. Some states have retained these non-marital legal
relationships, but stopped allowing couples to obtain such relationships soon
after same-sex marriage become an option there.43 Even in those states that
continue to allow registration or solemnization of those relationship, few
couples opt for civil unions or domestic partnerships now that marriage
equality has been achieved.44
union status, (2) designating the civil union as a marriage without a ceremony, or (3) getting
married and merging the civil union into the marriage. Civil Unions, ST. OF R.I. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
http://www.health.ri.gov/records/about/civilunions/ [https://perma.cc/9EBY-PM5R].
The following states that at one time had domestic partnerships as a form of relationship
recognition still have domestic partnerships and still allow couples to register for such
relationships: California (CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–299 (West 2017)) (domestic partnerships
available to same-sex couples and to different-sex couples with one partner over 62 years of age),
Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2017)) (domestic partnerships available to samesex couples and to different-sex couples), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122A (West 2017))
(domestic partnerships available to same-sex couples and to different-sex couples), Oregon (OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, Ch. 106 (West 2017)) (domestic partnerships available to same-sex
couples) and Washington, D.C. (D.C. CODE §§ 32:701-710 (2017)) (domestic partnerships
available to same-sex couples and to different-sex couples). Hawaii has reciprocal beneficiaries,
which are tantamount to quite “weak” domestic partnerships. Under the Reciprocal Beneficiaries
law, parties that are not otherwise eligible to marry under Hawaii law (but are not in another
marriage or civil union) may enter into a reciprocal beneficiary relationship with a subset of the
same benefits of marriage. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C (West 2017). The Hawaii reciprocal
beneficiary statue gives an example of parties who are not eligible to marry besides two people
of the same sex: a widowed mother and her unmarried son. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-2
(West 2017).
Wisconsin, which at one time had domestic partnerships as a form of relationship recognition
for same-sex couples, in contrast, no longer allows couples to obtain domestic partnerships but
still has the status of domestic partnership under state law, as couples who had obtained domestic
partnerships were allowed to retain that status. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 770.001, repealed by 2017
Act 59, § 2225d.
43. New Jersey, Rhode Island, Wisconsin and Vermont. See supra note 42.
44. Data on civil unions in Denver, Colorado and Hawaii is illustrative. In 2013, 761 couples
obtained civil unions in Denver. License Statistics: Civil Union Statistics, DENVER OFF. CLERK &
RECORDER, https://www.denvergov.org/content/denvergov/en/denver-office-of-the-clerk-andrecorder/marriage-civil-union-licenses/license-stats-and-records.html [https://perma.cc/GF2SANKM]. In 2014, 223 couples did. Id. Colorado began allowing same-sex couples to marry on
October 7, 2014. Ashley Atman, Colorado AG: County Clerks Must Issue Gay Marriage
Licenses,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(October
7,
2014,
1:27
PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/colorado-gay-marriage_n_5946752 [https://perma.cc/M5W2GBLK]. In 2017, 23 couples obtained civil unions. License Statistics: Civil Union Statistics,
DENVER OFF. CLERK & RECORDER, https://www.denvergov.org/content/denvergov/en/denveroffice-of-the-clerk-and-recorder/marriage-civil-union-licenses/license-stats-and-records.html
[ttps://perma.cc/GF2S-ANKM ]. In 2018, 12 couples obtained civil unions. Id.
In 2012, 730 couples obtained civil unions in Hawaii. Preliminary 2012 Vital Statistics, ST.
HAW.,
DEP’T
HEALTH,
http://health.hawaii.gov/vitalstatistics/preliminary-2012/
[https://perma.cc/6YPE-2V2Y]. In 2013, 388 couples did. Preliminary 2013 Vital Statistics, ST.
OF HAW., DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://health.hawaii.gov/vitalstatistics/preliminary-2013/
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The rest of my discussion proceeds as follows. In Part II, I discuss the
concepts and terminology used in this article. In Part III, I consider a certain
class of arguments against the legal recognition of group and plural
relationships—those that try to distinguish same-sex marriage, on the one
hand, from plural and group marriage, on the other. I suggest that, while these
legal arguments against such relationships are weak, it seems unlikely that
marriage will be extended to them in the near future. In Part IV, I conclude
with the suggestion that existing non-marital modes of relationships
recognition, namely civil unions and domestic partnerships, be repurposed
and adapted as what I call multiple partner unions, a mode of legal
relationship recognition for triads.
II.
This Part introduces the terminology used in the rest of this article.
Human sexual desire can be categorized in a variety of ways. Most typically
in our society, we classify people in terms of the sex or gender of their sexual
object choice, namely, whether they are gay, lesbian, heterosexual, or
bisexual.45 But sexual orientation is just one aspect of the broader notion of
sexual desire, sexual taste, or sexual interest. People have a wide range of
sexual tastes. Some people are particularly or primarily attracted to people of
certain age ranges, body types, races, hair colors, personality types and/or
[https://perma.cc/2K8P-8A29]. Hawaii allowed same-sex couples to marry starting December 2,
2013. Trudy Ring, First Same-Sex Couples Marry in Hawaii, Advocate.com (December 2, 2013,
2:10 PM), https://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2013/12/02/first-same-sexcouples-marry-hawaii [https://perma.cc/F8WX-3UX4]. In 2014, 32 couples obtained civil
unions.
Preliminary
2014
Vital
Statistics,
ST.
HAW.,
DEP’T
HEALTH,
http://health.hawaii.gov/vitalstatistics/preliminary-2014/ [https://perma.cc/L4GM-3BWX]. In
2015, 23 couples did. Preliminary 2015 Vital Statistics, ST. HAW., DEP’T HEALTH,
http://health.hawaii.gov/vitalstatistics/preliminary-2015/ [https://perma.cc/KAS9-L279]. In
2016, 29 couples obtained civil unions. Preliminary 2016 Vital Statistics, ST. HAW., DEP’T
HEALTH, http://health.hawaii.gov/vitalstatistics/preliminary-2016/ [https://perma.cc/B6Y9XNRC]. In 2017, 39 couples did. Preliminary 2017 Vital Statistics, ST. HAW., DEP’T HEALTH,
http://health.hawaii.gov/vitalstatistics/preliminary-2017/ [https://perma.cc/X2BV-H663]. And, in
2018, only 30 couples obtained civil unions. Preliminary 2018 Vital Statistics, ST. HAW., DEP’T
HEALTH,
http://health.hawaii.gov/vitalstatistics/preliminary-2018-vital-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/Q3TD-C4ZB].
45. EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY AND ETHICS OF
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 39–61 (1999). Some people, especially younger people, reject this
framework because they see and/or experience sex, gender and sexual orientation as non-binary
and more fluid. See, e.g., LISA M. DIAMOND, SEXUAL FLUIDITY: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S LOVE
AND DESIRE (2008); RITCH C. SAVIN-WILLIAMS, MOSTLY STRAIGHT: SEXUAL FLUIDITY AMONG
MEN (2017). For simplicity’s sake, for my terminology, I use the more “traditional” terminology,
but I do not think that doing so in any way impairs the core conclusions and proposal of this
article.
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professions, in addition to being attracted to people of a certain sex, gender,
gender identity and/or certain sexual orientation.46 People are not only
sexually interested in certain sorts of people, some also have quite specific
interests in certain sorts of sexual acts, sex in certain venues, and certain
frequency of having sex. In particular, some people may be sexually attracted
only to one person at a time and be completely satisfied having sex with just
this person and may be happy in a companionate and sexual relationship with
just that person. Such a person has monogamous desires. Most people,
however, even if they are in a dyadic relationship (that is, a relationship
between two people), remain sexually attracted to other people besides the
person with whom they are romantically involved and are tempted—for this
reason or others—to have sex with other people. These people have nonmonogamous desires. For a significant percent of people with nonmonogamous desires, it is very difficult to resist the temptation of nonmonogamy and remain sexually active with just one person for an extended
period of time.47 Over time, such people who in relationships may become
less interested in sex with their spouse or partner while remaining interested
in sex with other people. Others may remain as attracted to their spouse or
partner as they always were while still desiring sexual variety, especially as
time goes on. And others may desire sex outside of their relationship when
their spouse or partner becomes uninterested in sex or suffers from a health
problem that leaves them unable to have sex.48 Of course, a single person
(someone who is not in a dyadic relationship)—even a single person who is
not interested in being in a dyadic relationship—can have non-monogamous
desires insofar as such a person would like to have sex with more than one
partner outside of a marriage or a primary partnership.
Whether the focus is on behaviors or desires, non-monogamy takes many
forms. A single person, if sexually active, can be non-monogamous both in
terms of behavior and desire. The same is true of people in dyadic
relationships who have sexual desires for people other than their spouse or
partner. Some such people repress their desires for extra-dyadic sex, but
46. STEIN, supra note 45, at 49–67; Robin Dembroff, What Is Sexual Orientation?, 16:3
PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT 1 (2016); EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 22–
27 (1990); Fredrick Suppe, Curing Homosexuality, in PHILOSOPHY AND SEX 391, 394–97 (Robert
Baker & Frederick Elliston eds., rev. ed., 1984).
47. See, e.g., ERIC ANDERSON, THE MONOGAMY GAP: MEN, LOVE, AND THE REALITY OF
CHEATING 37–70 (2012); DAVID P. BARASH & JUDITH EVE LIPTON, THE MYTH OF MONOGAMY:
FIDELITY AND INFIDELITY IN ANIMALS AND PEOPLE (2001); CHRISTOPHER RYAN & CACILDA
JETHÁ, SEX AT DAWN: HOW WE MATE, WHY WE STRAY, AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR MODERN
RELATIONSHIPS (2010).
48. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 47, at 104–10; DAN SAVAGE, AMERICAN SAVAGE:
INSIGHTS, SLIGHTS AND FIGHTS ON SEX, FAITH, LOVE AND POLITICS 23–28 (2013).
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many others do not. Some people in dyadic relationships who have extradyadic sex do so secretly, that is, without admitting to their spouse or partner
that they have extra-dyadic sex. This form of non-monogamous behavior is
called infidelity. In contrast, some people in dyadic relationships agree that it
is permissible for at least one of them to have sex with other people, at least
under some circumstances. I call this consensual non-monogamy.49
There are two particular flavors of non-monogamy that are usefully
distinguished for my purposes here: polyamorous non-monogamy and
monogamish non-monogamy. According to one definition, polyamorous
people desire serious sexual and romantic involvement with more than one
person at a time.50 But according to another—perhaps more widely used—
definition, the non-monogamy involved in polyamory is necessarily
consensual. Hadar Aviram, for example, defines polyamory as desiring
“more than one sexual . . . loving relationship at the same time, with the full
knowledge and consent of all the partners involved.”51 Elizabeth Emens,
similarly, defines polyamory as a lifestyle that prioritizes and privileges “selfknowledge, radical honesty, consent, self-possession, and [variety when it
comes to] love and sex.”52 While I agree that consent is essential to many
self-identified polyamorous people, I find the first sense of the term
polyamory is also useful to distinguish one of several types of nonmonogamy, independent of whether the non-monogamy is consensual or
non-consensual.
Popular advice columnist Dan Savage coined the felicitous term
monogamish for people who are “mostly monogamous,” open to nonmonogamy on occasion but, generally, not “actively looking” for extra-

49. This paragraph and the preceding one are adapted from Edward Stein, Adultery,
Infidelity, and Consensual Non-Monogamy, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming). Similar
terminology is, for example, used by Terri D. Conley, et al., A Critical Examination of Popular
Assumptions About the Benefits and Outcomes of Monogamous Relationships, 17 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. REV. 124, 126 (2013). For discussion of different ways of structuring consensual
non-monogamous relationships, see, for example, BLAKE SPEARS & LANZ LOWEN, BEYOND
MONOGAMY: LESSONS FROM LONG-TERM GAY MALE COUPLES IN NON-MONOGAMOUS
RELATIONSHIPS,
(2010),
http://thecouplesstudy.com/wpcontent/uploads/BeyondMonogamy_1_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBU8-FU4V].
50. This definition of polyamory follows Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual
Orientation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2011) (defining polyamory as “a preference for
having multiple romantic relationships simultaneously”).
51. Hadar Aviram, Make Love, Not Law: Perceptions of the Marriage Equality Struggle
Among Polyamorous Activists, 7 J. BISEXUALITY 261, 264 (2008); see also SHEFF, supra note 33,
at 1 (“Polyamory is consensual, openly conducted, multiple-partner relationships . . . [involving]
negotiated access to additional partners outside of the traditional committed couple.”).
52. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous
Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 321 (2004).
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dyadic sex.53 Sometimes Savage uses this term in a way that seems to imply
that a monogamish relationship is a consensual one, but other times it is less
clear. As with polyamory, I find it useful to use the term monogamish for a
type of non-monogamy, independent of whether the non-monogamy is
consensual or not.
Focusing now on behavior, sexual behavior often does not accord with
desire. A person with non-monogamous desires may be monogamous in
terms of behavior, for example, either to avoid social and legal sanctions or
because of the lack of opportunity to find willing and appealing extra-dyadic
partners.54 Similarly, a person who desires to be monogamous may, for
various reasons, have extra-dyadic sex on occasion or may be celibate.
It is worthwhile to distinguish between two types of polyamorous
behaviors. Polyamorous people sometimes seek to be married to more than
one person at the same time. There are two distinct types of such
relationships, plural marriages and group marriages. A person in a plural
marriage is married to more than one person and the various people to whom
he or she is married are not married to each other.55 When a person is in a
plural marriage with two other people, it sometimes called a “vee” and when
a person is in a plural marriage with more than two people, it is sometimes
called a “hub and spoke” arrangement.56 In contrast, a person in a group
marriage is married to two or more people all of whom are also married to
each other.57 When I use the term polygamy, I mean to include both plural
53. Dan Savage, Savage Love: Monogamish, STRANGER (July 20, 2011),
http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/SavageLove?oid=9125045 [https://perma.cc/E4SR-HF4Y]
(coining the word monogamish). For discussion of this concept and Savage’s use of it, see Mark
Oppenheimer, Married, with Infidelities, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/magazine/infidelity-will-keep-us-together.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/64DL-D4N2].
54. Emens, supra note 52, at 330.
55. Ronald C. Den Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The Case for a Constitutional Right
to Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977, 1977 (2015).
56. See, e.g., Diane J. Klein, Plural Marriage and Community Property Law, 41 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 33, 47–48 (2010). For various reasons, including simplicity, I more often refer
to triads and group marriages/relationships than I do to vees and plural marriages/relationships.
For purposes of this article, my more frequent mention of triads than vees is not meant to be
significant. Exploring the legal and policy differences between them is something left for another
time. I do, however, have a hunch that concerns relating to consent may play out differently in
group relationship forms like triads than in plural relationship forms like vees.
57. Some people define plural marriage as when a person is married to more than one person
at a time regardless of whether or not the person/people to whom he or she is married are also
married to each other. On this alternative definitional scheme, all group marriages are plural
marriages but not all plural marriages are group marriages. For example, Chief Justice Roberts
talks about plural marriage in his dissenting opinion but cites to an example of a group marriage
(a “throuple” involving three women “married” to each other). Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
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marriage and group marriage. Of course, polygamy is not legal anywhere in
the United States because of the aforementioned “one-at-a-time” rule that
restricts marriage to people who have never been married or those whose
prior marriages have ended through annulment, divorce, or due to the death
of all prior spouses.58 Despite this, de facto plural and de facto group
marriages—as well as other plural and group relationships—exist throughout
the country.59
III.
In this Part, I consider post-Obergefell arguments for and against plural
and group marriages. Before Obergefell, opponents of marriage between
people of the same-sex tried to base arguments against same-sex marriage on
the strong intuitions held by many Americans that polygamy should be illegal
and is morally problematic.60 As previously noted, Chief Justice Roberts
made this type of argument in his Obergefell dissent; while allowing that
there may be significant differences between same-sex marriage, on the one
hand. and plural and group marriage, on the other,61 Roberts maintained that
2584, 2622 (2015). Roberts seems to include group marriages as a type of plural marriage. For
clarity, I distinguish among them, although for much of my discussion, I consider them together.
58. Typical of this structure is New York’s marriage law, which states “[a] marriage is
absolutely void if contracted by a person whose husband or wife by a former marriage is living,
unless . . . [s]uch former marriage has been annulled or . . . dissolved.” N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 6
(2019).
59. See BENNION, supra note 5, at 4–7; Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy,
Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1966–75 (2010); Casey
E. Faucon, Marriage Outlaws: Regulating Polygamy in America, 22 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
1, 1–3 (2015). For an earlier discussion of group marriage, see LARRY CONSTANTINE & JOAN
CONSTANTINE, GROUP MARRIAGE: A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY MULTILATERAL MARRIAGE 148–
61 (1973).
60. See, e.g., Hadley Arkes, Questions of Principle, Not Predictions: A Reply to Macedo,
84 GEO. L.J. 321, 326 (1995) (“If the notion of marriage were separated . . . from the fact that
only . . . a man and a woman[] could beget a child[,] then on what ground of principle could the
law confine marriage to ‘couples?’”); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional
Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 47 (“If same-sex marriage must be
legalized to accommodate the subjective, identity-defining sexual-intimacy preferences of gays
and lesbians, it would be very difficult to refuse to recognize . . . polygamy . . . on a principled
basis.”); Stanley Kurtz, Beyond Gay Marriage, WKLY. STANDARD (Aug. 4, 2003, 12:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/beyond-gay-marriage
[https://perma.cc/53TR-EYXL] (“[G]ay marriage [will] take us down a slippery slope to legalized
polygamy and ‘polyamory’ (group marriage).”).
61. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I do not mean to equate
marriage between same-sex couples with plural marriages in all respects. There may well be
relevant differences that compel different legal analysis. But . . . petitioners have not pointed to
any.”).
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Obergefell’s constitutional argument “appl[ied] with equal force to the claim
of a fundamental right to plural marriage.”62
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy, writing for the five-judge majority, found
that “the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the
person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that
right and that liberty.”63 In reaching this conclusion, he built on existing “right
to marry” cases including Loving v. Virginia,64 Zablocki v. Redhail,65 Turner
v. Safley,66 and United States v. Windsor.67 In so doing, he articulated and
drew on four principles that he said demonstrate why marriage is both
fundamental and should be available as a matter of right to same-sex couples:
(1) “the right to personal choice regarding marriage” that flows from the core
notion of individual autonomy,68 (2) the importance of marriage to
“safeguard[ing] children and families,”69 (3) marriage “is a keystone of our
social order,”70 and (4) there is something special and unique about
coupling—the two-person union—that is crucial to the centrality of marriage
to the Court’s jurisprudence.71
For purposes of this article, this fourth principle is the most significant.
Chief Justice Robert’s dissent takes direct issue with this principle. Roberts
said, “[a]lthough the majority randomly inserts the adjective ‘two’ in various
places, it offers no reason at all why the two-person element of the core
definition of marriage may be preserved while the man-woman element may
not.”72 It is to discussion of this point that I now turn.
Before Obergefell, advocates of access to marriage for same-sex couples
had to frequently respond to this type of invocation of polygamy by
distinguishing same-sex marriage from plural and group marriage. Among
the main distinctions they offered were the unequal roles of men and women
in plural relationships, the lack of consent in plural and group relationships,
the negative impact on children whose parents are polygamous, the
complexity of plural and group marriages, and an argument based on the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 2621.
Id. at 2604 (majority opinion).
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
570 U.S. 744 (2013).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
Id. at 2600.
Id. at 2601.
Id. at 2599.
Id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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simple fact that having two or more spouses is different from having one.73
Now that same-sex marriage is the law of the land, advocates of same-sex
marriage are off the hook when it comes to having to answer these arguments;
opponents of allowing group and plural marriages—some of whom no doubt
support access to marriage for same-sex couples—must take up the work of
distinguishing plural and group marriage from dyadic marriage (whether
between people of the same or different sex). What follows is a survey of the
possible arguments that might be made to that effect. I suggest that none of
these arguments succeeds as a matter of logic or public policy.
A. Polygamy Is Sexist or Bad for Women
Most polygamous relationships in the United States have been and are
polygynous (a plural or group marriage—typically, a plural marriage—in
which a person—typically, a man—has two or more wives).74 Historically,
women in polygynous relationships have had less power than the men in such
relationships, and some of them have suffered from abuse.75 In some
polygamous relationships, however, women do not play subservient roles and
the history of polygamy may not be as bad for women as some have
claimed.76 Further, there are plural and group relationships in which all of the
parties involved are of the same sex or in which the parties are “sex-equal”;77
women in these relationships are not subservient and are no more likely to be
abused than women in other sorts of relationships.
Also note that “traditional” marriages—that is, marriages between one
man and one woman—were historically deeply sexist in their legal character
and women in such relationships were typically subservient to their
73. See, e.g., DEN OTTER, supra note 2, at 69, 72.
74. David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 61
(1997).
75. See, e.g., Bala et al., supra note 34, at 7, 12–13; EMBRY, supra note 3, at 178.
76. See IRWIN ALTMAN & JOSEPH GINAT, POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY 364–65 (1996); BENNION, supra note 5, at 37–38; PHILIP L. KILBRIDE, PLURAL
MARRIAGE FOR OUR TIMES: A REINVENTED OPTION? 41–43 (1994). See generally Angela
Campbell, How Have Policy Approaches to Polygamy Responded to Women’s Experiences and
Rights? An International, Comparative Analysis, in POLYGAMY IN CANADA: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN: A COLLECTION OF POLICY RESEARCH REPORTS 1, 3–
11
(2005),
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/SW21-132-2005E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V99V-HK5E].
77. See Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for Same-Sex
Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1023, 1040 (2005);
Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Marry? Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Law, DISSENT
(2009),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/a-right-to-marry-same-sex-marriage-andconstitutional-law [https://perma.cc/5HV5-LX8M].
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husbands.78 That said, although some problematic gendered assumptions
remain associated with marriage, even before same-sex marriage reached all
fifty states, the institution of marriage had evolved to become more
egalitarian and had, as a formal legal matter, shed virtually all of its sexist
character.79 Plural and group relationships might similarly become more
egalitarian; perhaps legalizing polygamous marriage would speed up this
process. But even if many polygamous relationships are bad for women,
some are not. It is problematic to reject polygamy because some polygamous
relationships are bad for women.80
B. Consent
Another related possible distinction between group and plural marriages
and relationships, on the one hand, and same-sex marriages, on the other,
concerns whether all parties to a polygamous relationship have consented. At
the oral argument for Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Alito asked Mary
Bonauto, the lawyer arguing on behalf of the same-sex couples seeking
marriage equality, “Suppose that we rule in your favor . . . and then . . . a
group consisting of two men and two women apply for a marriage license.
Would there be any ground for denying them a license?”81 Bonauto started
her answer by citing “concerns about coercion and consent,”82 but Alito tried
to preclude this response by modifying his hypothetical as follows:
“[T]hey’re all consenting adults, highly educated. They are all lawyers.”83
Bonauto continued to focus on consent in her reply to Justice Alito’s modified
question involving the hypothetical four-lawyer group marriage.84 It may well
be true that, in some non-sex-equal polygynous marriages, the first wife does
not consent to the husband taking on a second wife. In Alito’s group marriage
hypothetical and many actual examples, such as Allen, Brian, and Charles or
Brynn, Kitten, and Doll, all parties have consented. Of course, it is possible
that a person who appears to consent to a group or plural marriage—or to
78.

See, e.g., JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW
FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 58–60 (2011) (discussing gender asymmetry in
marriage law focusing on doctrine of coverture and its demise).
79. For a similar point, see Calhoun, supra note 77, at 1040.
80. For a lengthy and, I think, persuasive discussion that arguments based on harms to
women and gender inequality are not strong arguments against polygamy generally, see generally
DEN OTTER, supra note 2, at 69–122.
81. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No.
14-556).
82. Id. at 17–18.
83. Id. at 18.
84. Id. at 17–19. The Justices returned a second time to polygamy in the oral arguments for
Obergefell. Id. at 57.
AND THE

1412

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

his/her spouse’s plural marriage—is not truly consenting and/or is suffering
from a kind of false consciousness.85 But the same is true with respect to some
“traditional” marriages (that is, dyadic “man-woman” marriages): some
women are pressured into marrying, some women marry because they feel
they have no choice, and the like. We do not reason from the lack of consent
in some dyadic marriages to the prohibition of all such marriages; nor should
we reason about plural and group marriages in that way either. Although
Alito was wrong to imply that the educational background or occupational
status of the people in his group marriage hypothetical is determinative of
their having consented, he was right to be dissatisfied with Bonauto’s appeal
to lack of consent as a response to arguments for polygamy. Some people do
knowingly choose to be in plural or group relationships, and some of them
wish to obtain legal recognition for their relationships.86 Even if someone
does not truly consent to his or her spouse seeking to bring an additional
person into their marriage—whether in a group or plural marriage—this does
not mean all plural or group marriages suffer from problems related to
consent.
C. Children
Another argument distinguishing same-sex marriage from plural and
group marriages is that children born to people in polygamous marriages will
be negatively affected compared to other children including children of
same-sex couples. This argument takes various forms including that,
compared to children in other types of families, children whose parents are in
plural or group marriages are more likely to be abused, neglected, and are
more likely to have psychological problems. While there are disturbing
instances of children in polygamous communities marrying—or entering de
facto or “celestial” marriages—when they are below the age of consent,87
such occurrences are neither a necessary nor a common feature of plural or
group marriages. There are civil and criminal procedures and penalties for
dealing with people who knowingly marry or have sex with underage
85. See Martha Bailey & Amy Kaufman, Should Civil Marriage Be Opened Up to Multiple
Parties?, 64 EMORY L.J. 1747, 1765–66 (2015). See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW passim (1978) (discussing problems with
women’s consent).
86. See, e.g., Elizabeth Joseph, My Husband’s Nine Wives, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at
A31 (“feminist” defense of polygamy). For a more general discussion of consent, see Orit Gan,
The Many Faces of Contractual Consent, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 615 (2017); cf. PATRICIA DIXONSPEAR, WE WANT FOR OUR SISTERS WHAT WE WANT FOR OURSELVES: AFRICAN AMERICAN
WOMEN WHO PRACTICE POLYGAMY BY CONSENT 25 (2009).
87. See Chatlani, supra note 34, at 129.
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children just as there are for dealing with parents who neglect or abuse their
children or allow them to be neglected or abused. The best way to prevent
such serious problems is to attack them directly, not by using polygamy as a
proxy for the actual cause of these ills.88
There is no direct link or established correlation between parents who are
in plural or group relationships and the neglect of children. And, while there
is some limited empirical research to support the claim that children of
polygamous parents have increased psychological problems, there is a more
robust empirical literature suggesting this is not the case.89 In fact, because
children in polygamous families may have more than two parents who care
for them, their upbringing may well be characterized by increased stability,
support and love. Although the claim that polygamy is bad for children is
widely held and has been used to justify raids on polygamous communities,
this claim is unsupported and the raids carried out based on this claim have
been disastrous.90 More generally, with the expansion of no-fault divorce, the
increased use of joint custody, and the frequency with which divorced people
remarry, it has become increasingly common for children to have more than
two parental figures.91 In fact, several states now allow for three or more legal
parents.92 It is no longer unusual for children to have more than two parental
figures in their lives and this may well be good for them. This cuts against
making a distinction between same-sex marriage and plural/group marriage
based on the impact on children.

88. State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 774–76 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
89. Compare Salman Elbedour et al., The Effect of Polygamous Marital Structure on
Behavioral, Emotional, and Academic Adjustment in Children: A Comprehensive Review of the
Literature, 5 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 255, 258–61 (2002) (identifying multiple
psychological risk factors for children in polygamous households), with Mark Goldfeder &
Elisabeth Sheff, Children of Polyamourous Families: A First Empirical Look, 5 J.L. & SOC.
DEVIANCE 150, 242–43 (2013) (concluding that it is in the best interest of some children to live
in a polygamous household that provides them more love and support). See generally SHEFF,
supra note 33.
90. See In re Steed, No. 03–08–00235–CV, 2008 WL 2132014 at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. May
22, 2008) aff’d, In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2008); see
also DEN OTTER, supra note 2, at 136–53 (providing detailed discussion of the argument that
polygamy is bad for children). See generally Ralph Nader, The Law v. Plural Marriages, 31
HARV. L. REC. 10 (1960).
91. See ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND
THE FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY 16–23 (2010).
92. See supra note 32.
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D. Two Is More Complicated than Three
Another commonly proposed distinction between polygamy and same-sex
marriage is that polygamy is simply much more complicated. It has been
observed that because “marriage is already structured to involve only two
people, the recognition of same-sex marriages [had] no economic costs. In
contrast, recognizing polygamous marriages would have significant potential
ramifications in terms of additional costs to the state . . . .”93 Note, however,
that various non-trivial changes had to be made to many states’ family laws
when same-sex marriage became legal in those states. Even so, it is certainly
true that U.S. family law is set up for two-person marriage and that, in order
to incorporate group and plural marriages, non-trivial changes would be
required to the default rules, statutes, common law, regulations, etc., that
make up family law. The changes involved would surely be more
complicated than those required when states started recognizing marriage
between people of the same sex. That said, marriage is a supple institution.
Numerous significant changes have been incorporated into family law over
the years, including, for example, the abolishment of coverture,94 the gradual
elimination of gender asymmetries in family law,95 and the advent of no-fault
divorce.96 Further, as Adrienne Davis and others have shown, it is far from
impossible to adapt the law of domestic relations to allow plural and group
marriages.97 Along these lines, family law did evolve to deal with “serial
polygamy” and the complicated family structures that result when people
marry three or more times and have children with different people. Further,
as previously mentioned, state laws allowing for three or more legal parents
are now in place in several states, showing that this sort of change in family
law is quite possible.98 If living in a more complicated legal structure is better
for the people involved or required by constitutional considerations,

93.
94.

Bala et al., supra note 34, at 38.
On marriage as an evolving institution, see generally NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A
HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 205–07 (2000) and HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN & WIFE IN
AMERICA: A HISTORY passim (2000).
95. On elimination of gender asymmetries in family law, see, for example, GROSSMAN &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 78, at 70–71.
96. On development of no-fault divorce, see GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN
TRADITION 161–68 (1991).
97. See generally Martha M. Ertman, The Business of Intimacy: Bridging the PrivatePrivate Distinction, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY
467, 467–69 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty, eds. 2005); Davis, supra note 59,
at 1958–61; Klein, supra note 8, at 33–34. For further discussion of the complexity of polygamy,
see DEN OTTER, supra note 2, at 153–58.
98. See generally CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057 (West 2013).
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administrative complexity alone is not a strong argument against such
alternative legal relationship forms.
E. The Right To Marry Some One You Love
Jonathan Rauch has pointed out a possible disanalogy between laws that
prohibit same-sex couples from marrying and laws that prohibit polygamy:
arguments for same-sex marriage involve the demand by LGBT people for
the right to marry someone they love, while arguments for plural and group
marriage involve the demand by polyamorous people for the right to marry
everyone they love.99 Rauch’s argument is, in effect, that it is greedy to make
a demand for more than one spouse. This is a misleading critique of
polygamy.
To help see this, contrast the current “one-at-a-time” rule with the more
restrictive “one-bite-at-the-apple” rule that would allow every adult the
possibility to be married to only one person over the course of a lifetime.
Under the “one-bite-at-the-apple” rule, a person whose spouse dies or whose
marriage ends in divorce is not permitted to marry again.100 Part of what is
problematic about the “one-bite-at-the-apple” rule is that it seems to be a
restriction of the right to marry. A person whose spouse has died seems
entitled to marry again if he or she so desires. We might admire the widow
who decided not to remarry because she already married her one true love,
but it seems wrong to prevent her from remarrying if she wishes to. A person
who wants to marry again is not being greedy even though he or she has
already been married. Our current marriage system allows for “serial
polygamy” but not “contemporaneous polygamy.” What justifies this
difference if not one of the considerations I discussed above? This suggests
that Rauch’s argument is circular.
F. Immutability and Innateness
I turn now to a proposed difference between same-sex marriage and
polygamy that appeals to immutability based on the idea that sexual
orientations are innate or immutable while the desire for polygamous
relationships is not. As William Saletan put it, “[i]mmutability is the biggest

99. See Jonathan Rauch, Marrying Somebody, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, A
READER 284, 286 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997).
100. This is not unprecedented in United States family law. South Carolina, for example, did
not allow divorce until 1948. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 78, at 161.
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difference between homosexuality and polyamory.”101 Similarly, Jonathan
Rauch distinguished polygamy from same-sex marriage, noting that “some
people are constitutively attracted only to members of the same sex” while
no one is “constitutively attracted . . . to groups rather than individuals.”102
Especially in light of Justice Kennedy’s invocation of the immutability of
same-sex sexual orientations,103 this might be a promising way to distinguish
same-sex marriage from group and plural marriage in the eyes of
constitutional law: same-sex sexual desire “occupies a deeper level of human
consciousness”104 than the desire to have more than one sexual or romantic
relationship at the same time.
To begin, while it is well established that sexual orientations are (i) not
consciously chosen and (ii) are very difficult or impossible to change,105 it is
far from proven that sexual orientations are innate.106 To easily distinguish
desire for polygamous relationships from desire for same-sex relationships,
polyamory would need to either be consciously chosen or relatively easy to
change. There is, however, very little research on the origins of polyamory.
That said, some (but not all) polyamorous people claim they never chose to
have the desire for multiple contemporaneous romantic relations and they
have felt polyamorous as long as they have had sexual desires; this fits with
the idea that polyamory is innate and not chosen.107 In fact, given how robust
101. William Saletan, The Case Against Polygamy, SLATE (June 29, 2015, 2:47 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/06/is_polygamy_next_after_gay
_marriage_chief_justice_roberts_obergefell_dissent.html [https://perma.cc/3PYE-CTMX].
102. Rauch, supra note 99, at 286.
103. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
104. Andrew Sullivan, Three’s a Crowd, NEW REPUBLIC (June 17, 1996), reprinted in
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, A READER, supra note 99, at 279.
105. See, e.g., Jack Drescher, “Sexual Conversion (‘Reparative’) Therapies: History and
Update,” in MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER
COMMUNITIES 71 (Billy E. Jones & Marjorie J. Hill eds., 2002); SEXUAL CONVERSION THERAPY:
ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES (Ariel Shidlo et al. eds., 2002); STEIN, supra
note 45, at 258–74.
106. See, e.g., DIAMOND, supra note 45; LOUIS GOOREN & WILLIAM BYNE, Sexual
Orientation in Men and Women, in 4 HORMONES, BRAINS AND BEHAVIOR 164 (Donald W. Pfaff
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017); STEIN, supra note 45. Recently, a sophisticated large-scale scientific study
of sexual orientation was conducted. This study suggests that sexual orientation does have a
genetic component, but to the degree that most human characteristics do, that a significant
component of sexual orientation is environmental, and that there is no single gene sequence that
is responsible for same-sex sexual attraction. See Andrea Ganna et al., Large-Scale GWAS
Reveals Insights into the Genetic Architecture of Same-Sex Sexual Behavior, 365 SCIENCE 882,
882–85 (2019); Melinda Mills, How Do Genes Affect Same-Sex Behavior, 365 SCIENCE 869, 869–
70 (2019).
107. See Emens, supra note 52, at 350–52; Elisabeth Sheff, Polyamorous Women, Sexual
Subjectivity and Power, 34 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 251, 274 (2005); Tweedy, supra note 50
passim.
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sexual desires are and the fact that many people have a hard time being
monogamous,108 even given the social pressure and legal norms that push in
this direction, indicates that polyamory is at least difficult, and perhaps
impossible, to change. Just as, in the past, lesbians, gay men and bisexuals
tried to change their sexual orientation and failed,109 and this was seen as
supporting the immutability of sexual orientation, so too do many people who
want to remain “faithful” to their spouses or partners (that is, to be
monogamous) but cannot “control themselves.” This suggests the desire to
be non-monogamous may also be immutable. Because of the lack of evidence
about the origins of polyamory combined with some suggestive evidence
polyamory might be neither chosen nor changeable, it is not clear how
different sexual orientation and polyamory are in terms of innateness, lack of
choice, and changeability.
Some scholars and courts, when talking about immutability, have invoked
a different sense of immutability, what I call “soft” immutability, according
to which a trait is immutable if changing it is very difficult or if the trait is so
important to a person’s identity that it is deeply problematic for the
government to force a person to change that trait.110 The Connecticut Supreme
Court, for example, in a case concerning relationship recognition for samesex couples, held “sexual orientation is . . . an essential component of
personhood [such that] even if there is some possibility that a person’s sexual
preference can be altered, it would be wholly unacceptable for the state to
require anyone to do so.”111 Sexual orientation is surely immutable in this
sense of the term, but so too is polyamory. Just as the state should not try to
change a person’s deeply-held attraction to people of the same sex, even if
this were possible to change, for the very same reasons, the state should not
try to change a person’s deeply-held desire to have multiple,
contemporaneous partners.112
108. See generally BARASH & LIPTON, supra note 47; RYAN & JETHÁ, supra note 47.
109. See Tia Powell & Edward Stein, Legal and Ethical Concerns About Sexual Orientation
Change Efforts, HASTINGS CTR. REP. Sept.–Oct. 2014, at 32, 33 (2014).
110. See Edward Stein, Immutability and Innateness Arguments About Lesbian, Gay, and
Bisexual Rights, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597, 633–35 (2014) (discussing “soft” immutability); see
also Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 652 (2001)
(trying to resuscitate an argument based on immutability by reading immutability “softly”).
111. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 2008).
112. For related arguments about immutability, see DEN OTTER, supra note 2, at 251–54;
SONU BEDI, BEYOND RACE, SEX AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 238–44 (2013). This is especially
clear for people who want to marry more than one person at the same time for religious reasons
since religious affiliation and beliefs are canonical examples of characteristics that are softly
immutable. See Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1508 (2011); Douglas Laycock, Taking
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G. Summary
My discussion in this Part shows that none of the attempts to distinguish
arguments for same-sex marriage from arguments for group and plural
marriages succeed. This does not, however, lead to the conclusion Chief
Justice Roberts was aiming for in his Obergefell dissent; that is, my
conclusion does not make for an argument against same-sex marriage any
more than it makes for an argument against access to marriage generally.
Further, my discussion in this Part, combined with the absence of strong
arguments against group and plural marriage,113 does not lead me to think that
the legalization of group or plural marriage is forthcoming soon—quite the
contrary, especially given the negative attitude that most Americans have
towards polygamy. According to Gallup, which conducts an annual survey
of the “values and beliefs” of Americans, in 2019, eighty percent of
Americans believe that polygamy is “morally wrong.”114 That said, there are
a growing number of triads like Allen, Brian, and Charles and Brynn, Kitten
and Doll in spouse-like relationships and who would like legal protections
for their relationships, who need such legal protections, and who deserve
them. If it is plural and group marriage that Americans find morally wrong,
then a promising pathway for relationship recognition for triads and quads
could be existing domestic partnership and civil union laws. My suggestion
is to repurpose and adapt these existing legal structures to create what I call
multiple partner unions.
IV.
Domestic partnerships were created starting in the 1980s after early
attempts to get access to marriage for same-sex couples failed.115 For some
advocates of LGBT rights, the goal in creating such alternative modes of
relationship recognition was not to get access to marriage. Rather, the idea
was to create state-sanctioned non-marital family forms that could provide
benefits and protections for same-sex couples and others who did not wish
Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 TEX. L. REV. 343, 383 (1981) (book
review).
113. See generally DEN OTTER, supra note 2.
114. Megan Brenan, Birth Control Still Tops List of Morally Acceptable Issues, GALLUP
NEWS SERV. (May 29, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/257858/birth-control-tops-listmorally-acceptable-issues.aspx [https://perma.cc/N32J-79PX].
115. See, e.g., Edward Stein, The Story of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health: The
Bumpy Road to Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 27 (Carol Sanger ed.,
2007); Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1 (2015); NeJaime, supra note 38, at 87.
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to—and/or could not—marry.116 But, by the end of the twentieth century, the
non-marital family forms that some states had created had become almost
equivalent to marriage in those states. Vermont civil unions provide a clear
example.
In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held that Vermont’s state
constitution required that same-sex and different-sex couples have access to
the same benefits, rights, responsibilities and duties associated with
marriage.117 The court was unanimous in finding Vermont’s failure to provide
same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain the rights, benefits, duties and
obligations of marriage unconstitutional, although the justices used different
theories to reach that conclusion.118 In terms of the remedy, the court ordered
the state legislature to change its law of domestic relations to allow same-sex
couples access to the same benefits (and responsibilities) as different-sex
couples.119 In response, in 2000, the Vermont state legislature did just that,
passing a civil union law that created a new legal relationship for same-sex
couples.120 Vermont’s civil union law, like California’s domestic partner law
starting in 2005, provided all the rights, benefits and duties associated with
marriage under state law.121 What it did not provide were any federal benefits
or any benefits in other states that did not have an equivalent form of
relationship recognition.122 The federal government did not—and still does
not, for the most part—provide recognition to civil unions and domestic
partnerships. That said, creating multiple partner unions that, like Vermont
civil unions, provide all the benefits of marriage provided under state law, is
the next best alternative short of allowing plural or group marriages. And
creating multiple partner union with fewer benefits than marriage, like the
weaker domestic partnerships that California had before 2005 (and that other
jurisdictions had more recently), would be better than the status quo for plural
and group relationships.
Of course, there is significant work that would need to be done to
repurpose and adapt existing civil union and domestic partnership law for
multiple partner unions. In particular, there are three main issues that need to
be dealt with: entrance into a multiple partner union, exit from a multiple
partner union (whether through partial or complete dissolution/divorce of a
116. See, e.g., Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK:
NAT’L LESBIAN & GAY Q , Fall 1989, at 9, reprinted in SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 337
(William Eskridge et al. eds., 4th ed. 2018).
117. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 889.
120. VT. STAT ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (West 2017).
121. VT. STAT ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (West 2017).
122. See id.
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multiple partner union), and the benefits available to those in multiple partner
unions. Fortunately, a handful of scholars have made some significant
proposals for what multiple partner unions would look like. The two most
promising, in my view, are found in Adrienne Davis’s article Regulating
Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality and in
Diane Klein’s article Plural Marriage and Community Property Law. 123
These articles are an ideal starting point for crafting an implementation of my
proposal to adapt existing civil union and domestic partnership laws for
multiple partner unions.
Fifty years ago, the idea of two people of the same sex getting married was
shocking to most Americans. Twenty years ago, some jurisdictions started
allowing for robust legal protections for same-sex couples and five years ago
marriage for same-sex couples was a reality throughout the entire United
States. The pathway to legal recognition for plural and group relationships in
the United States is surely going to be different, as plural marriage has been
a topic of debate for much of this nation’s history, long before same-sex
marriage was an issue in this country. That said, the legal arguments in favor
of plural and group marriage seem in the process of going from being “off
the wall” to being “on the wall,” that is, they seem to be starting to shift from
being arguments that “most well-trained lawyers think are clearly wrong” to
“arguments that are at least plausible, and therefore may become law,
especially if brought before judges likely to be sympathetic to them.”124
Families consisting of triads and quads and their children deserve the dignity
and respect that are accorded other families through the law of domestic
relations. It is time to start figuring out how to give these families the dignity
and respect that they deserve.

123. Davis, supra note 59; Klein, supra note 8.
124. Jack M. Balkin, From off the Wall to on the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went
Mainstream,
ATLANTIC
(June
4,
2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-themandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/ [https://perma.cc/B4VP-HBT2].

